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Abstract
Prior to a main randomized clinical trial, investigators often carry out a pilot or feasibility
study in order to test certain trial processes or estimate key statistical parameters, so as
to optimize the design of the main trial and/or determine whether it can feasibly be run.
Pilot studies reflect the design of the intended main trial, whereas feasibility studies
may not do so, and may not involve allocation to different treatments. Testing relative
clinical effectiveness is not considered an appropriate aim of pilot or feasibility studies.
However, consent is no less important than in a main trial as a means of morally legiti-
mizing the investigator's actions. Two misperceptions are central to consent in clinical
studies—therapeutic misconception (a tendency to conflate research and therapy) and
therapeutic misestimation (a tendency to overestimate possible benefits and/or under-
estimate possible harms associated with participation). These phenomena may take a
distinctive form in pilot and feasibility studies, owing to potential participants' likely
prior unfamiliarity with the nature and purposes of such studies. Thus, participants may
confuse the aims of a pilot or feasibility study (developing or optimizing trial design and
processes) with those of a main trial (testing treatment effectiveness) and base consent
on this misconstrual. Similarly, a misunderstanding of the ability of pilot and feasibility
studies to provide information that will inform clinical care, or the underdeveloped
nature of interventions included in such studies, may lead to inaccurate assessments of
the objective possibility of benefit, and weaken the epistemic basis of consent accord-
ingly. Equipoise may also be particularly challenging to grasp in the context of a pilot
study. The consent process in pilot and feasibility studies requires a particular focus,
and careful communication, if it is to carry the appropriate moral weight. There are
corresponding implications for the process of ethical approval.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In systematic evaluation of clinical interventions, pilot and feasibility stud-
ies (PFSs) are increasingly carried out prior to a definitive, or main, ran-
domized clinical trial;1,2 usually a phase 3 trial. The term ‘pilot study’ is
sometimes applied to phase 1 trials, or to preliminary studies receiving
small seedcorn institutional grants prior to an external funding application,
but these differ from the type of pilot study considered here, which is fur-
ther downstream and occurs more or less immediately before a definitive
phase 3 study, and after any phase 1 and 2 trials have been completed.3
The purpose of PFSs is to gather information that will optimize
the main trial—such as by estimating the number of eligible potential
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participants, the consent rate, loss to follow-up, treatment fidelity,
and compliance, and by testing methods of randomization, blinding
and outcome measurement.4,5 PFSs may additionally serve to inform
a sample size calculation,6 refine or fine-tune the interventions to be
tested in a main trial,2 and assess the acceptability of such interven-
tions and study procedures.1 They may also be used—with question-
able appropriateness7—to obtain preliminary estimates of treatment
effects. Importantly, any such estimates should not be subjected to
formal statistical testing to determine treatment effectiveness, this
being the role of a main trial.2,3 In these ways, PFSs can inform a deci-
sion as to whether a main trial is viable (Table 1).
A feasibility study and a pilot study are often distinguished from
each another as follows.3,8 Feasibility studies are any study carried
out to inform the design or delivery of a subsequent main trial, and do
not necessarily adopt the design of the main trial. Pilot studies are,
more specifically, a version of the main trial run on a smaller scale,
either in its entirety or in part, and therefore involve allocating partici-
pants to two or more treatment groups. Accordingly, whilst all pilot
studies are feasibility studies, not all feasibility studies are pilot stud-
ies. For the most part, this paper will focus on PFSs jointly, but where
there is a separate focus on either a pilot or a feasibility study, as dis-
tinguished above, this will be indicated. Additionally, the type of pilot
studies at issue will be those carried out in advance of a main trial
(‘external’ pilot studies), rather than those that may be carried out as
a preliminary phase within the main trial (‘internal’ pilot studies).9
Notwithstanding these definitions and distinctions, it is only
recently that a consensus has been approached on the nature and role
of PFSs,8 and the clinical research community have historically not
been clear on how they should be defined. Given this, and in the light
of evidence that public understanding of clinical research is
limited,10-12 it is perhaps safe to assume, in the absence hitherto of
clear empirical data, that patients' understanding of the nature and
purpose of PFSs will be even less robust. Plausibly, such understand-
ing that patients have of clinical research is likely to relate more
closely to conventional main trials.
The benefits that flow from PFSs differ from those of a main clini-
cal trial. In the latter, the aim is to secure clinical benefit for future
patients by assessing the merits of competing treatments. In contrast,
PFSs assist the development and conduct of a subsequent main trial
and/or inform the decision as to whether such a trial should be under-
taken. The proximate benefit arising from PFSs relates therefore to
the social value of informing researchers where they should best
direct their efforts and research resources, and to the scientific value
of optimizing methodological rigour. Any generalizable clinical benefit
from a PFS will be therefore indirect, as it can only occur through the
subsequent clinical trial, and uncertain, to the extent that it is contin-
gent on the subsequent trial taking place. From an ethical perspective,
the nature, magnitude and likelihood of the benefit anticipated from a
study play a part in justifying any risk of harm that it may involve.13 In
a conventional RCT, a justification specifically in terms of clinical ben-
efit assumes that the trial is likely to generate findings that have clini-
cal utility, whereas in a PFS it assumes not only that a subsequent trial
will generate such findings but also that such a trial will take place.
Justification of a PFS should not, therefore, rely solely on contingent
clinical benefit, but should rest principally on its more immediate and
more assured social value in informing subsequent research.
As pilot studies, and most feasibility studies, involve human par-
ticipants, they raise ethical issues similar to those of other clinical
studies, but have received little specific attention in the literature.
Moreover, PFSs, although subject to the same requirement as main
trials for approval from an institutional review board or research
ethics committee, do not feature in major guidance on research
ethics.2 Compared to main trials, PFSs are on a smaller scale and have
an apparently ancillary status, which might suggest that the demands
of consent are less stringent. However, they raise similarly challenging
issues. This paper will focus on these issues and will suggest in partic-
ular that some aspects of consent should be reconceptualized, given
the differing aims of these studies from those of main clinical trials.
Some practical issues will also be explored.
2 | CONSENT IN CLINICAL STUDIES
Consent serves to protect and support autonomous decision-making on
the part of the potential research participant.14 It therefore has a legiti-
mizing function in relation to actions that the researcher wishes to per-
form that would be impermissible in the absence of such consent.15 As
lack of information constrains autonomous decision-making, disclosure
TABLE 1 Purposes for which main trials and pilot or feasibility
studies may be used
Main (definitive) randomized




To examine subgroups effects
and/or treatment mediators
To conduct a health economics
analysis (eg, cost-
effectiveness or cost-utility
analysis) of the treatments
tested
To plan implementation of trial
findings
To assess feasibility of trial
processes (eg, recruitment,
screening, consent, blinding)
To estimate clinicians' willingness
to randomize patients and
patients' willingness to be
randomized
To assess treatment fidelity
(clinicians) and treatment
adherence (participants)
To refine or optimize one or more
of the intended treatments
To test outcome measurement
and select a primary outcome
measure
To determine the acceptability of
intended treatments
To estimate parameters required
for a sample size calculation for
a main trial (eg, standard
deviation of scores, rate of
missing values)
To gain preliminary estimates of
treatment effect
To inform a decision as to
whether a main trial should be
undertaken
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on the part of the researcher and comprehension on the part of the par-
ticipant are prerequisites for consent.16 Many of the problematic
aspects of consent centre, however, on these aspects,17 and an impor-
tant issue here is what Sisk and Kodish18 call therapeutic
misperception.
2.1 | Therapeutic misperception
Two main types of therapeutic misperception have been identified.
Therapeutic misconception, first articulated by Appelbaum et al,19,20
concerns participants' potential misunderstanding of the nature and
purpose of a clinical trial, and a tendency to confuse research with
therapy.21 Therapeutic misconception centres firmly on the purposes
of a trial, not its consequences, and exists
when individuals do not understand that the defining pur-
pose of clinical research is to produce generalizable knowl-
edge, regardless of whether the subjects enrolled in the
trial may potentially benefit from the intervention under
study or from other aspects of the clinical trial.22,p. 1736
Therapeutic misconception has two main elements: first, ‘an
incorrect belief that the patient/participant's individualized needs will
determine assignment to treatment conditions or lead to modifica-
tions of the treatment regime’ and, second, ‘an unreasonable appraisal
of the nature or likelihood of medical benefit from participation in the
study, due to misperception of the nature of the research enter-
prise’.20,p. 636 These misunderstandings are likely to be accompanied
by a poor comprehension of the methods used to achieve the goals of
the research. Hence, trial participants may not appreciate that ran-
domization is a purely stochastic process and has nothing to do with—
indeed, is largely incompatible with—the provision of personalized
care, despite receiving a prior explanation to this effect.23,24 Of
course, the simple fact of taking part in a clinical trial may in itself be
beneficial25—a phenomenon referred to as ‘inclusion benefit’.26 How-
ever, the trial is not designed to provide individualized benefit to par-
ticipants. Although the way in which a treatment is defined in a
protocol for a pragmatic trial may be sufficiently flexible to allow the
clinician to deliver that treatment with some regard to the participant's
particular clinical presentation, this does not equate to personalized
care, as the allocation of the participant to the treatment in that arm
of the trial is predetermined at the point of randomization. Therapeu-
tic misconception may also relate to an understanding of the nature
of the interventions within a trial, such as the use of a placebo, as
suggested by Appelbaum's report of a participant in a trial of pharma-
cological interventions for a psychiatric disorder who believed that
the placebo ‘would be given only to those subjects who “might not
need medication”’.20,p. 22
Therapeutic misestimation is a similar but distinct phenomenon. It
has to do with the way in which participants may overestimate the
benefits and/or underestimate the harms associated with taking part
in a trial;27 this may reflect a broader tendency, beyond the research
context, for patients to inflate possible benefits and downplay possi-
ble harms.28 Therapeutic misestimation may stem from an erroneous
processing of specific factual information that the investigator has
provided as part of the consent process, or it may represent prior
assumptions on the part of the participant that are wide of the mark.
Common to both of these forms of misperception is likely to be
an underlying hope of therapeutic benefit from research participa-
tion.18,29,30 With regard to consent, these misperceptions become
morally significant to the extent that they influence the individual's
motivation to enter a trial and, thereby, his or her decision either to
grant or to withhold consent.31,32 I will argue, however, that the way
in which we conceptualize such misperception should differ some-
what in relation to PFSs.
3 | THERAPEUTIC MISPERCEPTION IN
PILOT AND FEASIBILITY STUDIES
At the root of participants' misperception of clinical research may be
their attempt to understand aspects of the research situation in terms
of one that is more familiar to them. Thus, in conventional clinical tri-
als the individual may reinterpret the researcher-participant relation-
ship in terms of the more familiar doctor-patient relationship.33,34 In
PFSs, however, this reinterpretation may take an additional form. If, in
addition to drawing upon their experience of the clinical encounter,
potential participants seek to make sense of such a study in relation
to any understanding they may have of clinical research, as argued
earlier this is more likely to be in the context of a main trial than the
less familiar context of a PFS. Hence, in addition to their assimilation
in participants' minds to clinical practice (with potential misunder-
standing as to the issue of individualized care), PFSs may be assimi-
lated to main trials (with potential misunderstanding as to the
production of generalizable clinical insights).
3.1 | Therapeutic misconception
So, participants in PFSs may be subject to an additional form of thera-
peutic misconception that differs somewhat from its conventional
definition in the context of a main trial (Table 2). As well as assuming
that taking part in a study will allow them to receive personalized
care—the traditional interpretation of therapeutic misconception—
they may also assume that their participation will contribute to evi-
dence that can be applied directly to broader clinical practice. Thus,
not only may they misconceive the likelihood of their own individual-
ized medical benefit within the study, but they may further mis-
conceive the likely medical benefit for patients more widely beyond
the study. This is problematic for consent in two ways. First, potential
participants bring with them their own personality and other individ-
ual characteristics and may have a variety of reasons for taking part in
a PFS; but if, through a sense of altruism, they base their consent on
this mistaken belief in generalizable clinical benefits, it will be founded
on a misunderstanding and its legitimizing moral force will be
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undermined accordingly. Second, and relatedly, a decision to consent
is likely also to have been based, at least in part, on a relative assess-
ment of the potential benefit and harm associated with participa-
tion.35 For this assessment to be epistemically sound, the particular
nature of the benefit at stake should not be misconceived, as
assessing the magnitude of a benefit cannot be separated from an
understanding of the form it will take.
It follows that, in order for their consent to carry the necessary
moral weight, participants should not mistakenly assume that their
participation will contribute directly to generalizable clinical benefit
for future patients—such benefit will derive from a subsequent main
trial and is, moreover, contingent on this later trial taking place. How-
ever, it is important that potential participants should have the neces-
sary information to exercise their autonomy in relation to both the
giving and the withholding of consent. Accordingly, in addition to
understanding what the immediate benefit of a PFS is not, they should
understand what it is—the higher-order value of directing research
efforts and resources appropriately and of maximizing the scientific
value of clinical research. In this way, a decision either to accept or to
decline participation will have a sound epistemic basis.
Therapeutic misconception may arise in somewhat different ways
in pilot studies vs non-randomized feasibility studies. As pilot studies are
designed to resemble the main trial in a number of respects, misunder-
standing as to their capacity to produce evidence of generalizable treat-
ment effectiveness may be pronounced. In a non-randomized feasibility
study, however, this problem might be mitigated, insofar as there is less
resemblance to a main trial. Notwithstanding this, another counter-
vailing feature of feasibility studies may potentially widen the gap
between assumed and actual evidence of clinical effectiveness. Many of
the elements that might inform subsequent clinical management may
simply be missing from a non-randomized feasibility study. For example,
if only one intervention is delivered, in order to determine treatment
fidelity or assess its acceptability to participants, the absence of a com-
parator intervention will prevent useful information being obtained on
an appropriate choice between different treatments.
3.2 | Therapeutic misestimation
Therapeutic misestimation may also take a distinct form in PFSs. One
way in which it may manifest itself relates to the intervention included
within a pilot or feasibility study. In a main trial (eg, a phase 3 or phase
4 trial), the interventions tested will normally have been fully refined in
terms of their individual efficacy. In a PFS, this may not be the case, as
one of its objectives may be to optimize the nature, dose, frequency or
method of delivery of an intervention. However, participants in these
studies may wrongly assume that the study treatments, one of which
they will receive, have previously been optimized in the same way as
prior to a main trial. They may appreciate that the relative effectiveness
of the study treatments is as yet undetermined, but they will quite
probably assume that the absolute effectiveness of each of them has
largely been established. In this way, the overestimation of benefit that
is part of therapeutic misestimation may be compounded in a PFS if its
objectives include the development of the study interventions.
Another respect in which therapeutic misestimation is troublesome
relates to perceptions of possible benefit through modification of treat-
ment. In some situations, participants may understand that a trial is not
concerned with individualized treatment selection, but may nonetheless
anticipate that they will benefit from what is learned from the trial data,
through alterations to their treatment regimen. Whilst this may not be
the case in clinical trials centred on illnesses with a rapidly evolving trajec-
tory or those evaluating ‘one-off’ surgical procedures—where participants
have little or no opportunity to benefit clinically from the knowledge
gained at the end of the study—in the case of chronic diseases partici-
pants' own clinical care may subsequently be informed by the trial's find-
ings. However, as gauging treatment effectiveness is not an appropriate
goal of PFSs,2,3 there is little likelihood of the participant's own future
clinical care being directly influenced by the results of these studies. This
must await the results of any subsequent main trial. Accordingly, if a par-
ticipant anticipates this type of clinical benefit from enrolling in a pilot or
feasibility study, the fact that treatment effectiveness will not be informed
by such a study may bring about a misestimation of benefit. This differs
somewhat from the traditional construal of therapeutic misestimation in a
conventional trial; there, the misperception centres principally on how
much clinical benefit can be expected through taking part, whereas in
PFSs it relates more to the possibility of clinical benefit (Table 2).
3.3 | The issue of equipoise
Certain feasibility objectives—such as estimating the consent rate or
the degree of loss to follow-up, or gauging clinicians' willingness to
TABLE 2 How therapeutic misperception may occur in main trials and in pilot and feasibility studies
Misperception Main randomized clinical trial Pilot or feasibility study
Therapeutic misconception A mistaken belief that the goal of the trial is
personalized care, rather than research
As for a main trial, but additionally a mistaken assumption that
the findings of the study will directly inform broader clinical
practice, rather than informing a subsequent trial with that
aim
Therapeutic misestimation A tendency to overestimate the magnitude
of potential benefit, and underestimate
the magnitude of potential harm, involved
in taking part in the trial
As for a main trial, but additionally an overestimation of the
possibility of gaining clinical benefit during or after the study,
given that the design of a pilot or feasibility study and/or the
stage of refinement of the intervention may not conduce to
such benefit
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randomize their patients, or assessing the effectiveness of blinding—
will normally require a randomized pilot study using the two or more
interventions that would be tested in the main trial. This in turn will
require a consideration of equipoise—the extent to which, at the out-
set of a study, the individual investigator (in the case of individual, or
theoretical, equipoise) or the clinical community (in the case of clinical
equipoise) is genuinely unsure of the relative merits of the interven-
tions concerned.36 Clinical equipoise does not require an even split of
opinion in the clinical community, merely that each of the alternative
interventions is favoured by some portion of this community for the
disease in question.37
Patients' uncertainty as to the investigator's treatment prefer-
ences often underlies their decisions regarding participation in clinical
trials.38-41 This suggests that an understanding of equipoise is relevant
to such decisions regarding consent, and the investigator will there-
fore often seek to provide such an explanation. Herein lies a particular
challenge in the specific case of randomized pilot studies. As partici-
pants are being asked to agree to being allocated to one of two or
more treatments, investigators face the task of explaining a belief in
the equivalent effectiveness of these interventions—a challenging task
at the best of times.42,43 However, they must at the same time make
it clear that the goal of a pilot study is not about determining the rela-
tive effectiveness of the treatments involved. Both of these
considerations—the presence of equipoise and the specific purpose of
the study—are likely to be relevant to a participant's decision on
whether to consent,35,38 and should therefore be communicated.
However, while these considerations are conceptually distinct, they
may be hard to reconcile in the participant's mind—‘is this study to do
with treatment effectiveness or is it not?’—and may thereby com-
pound the difficulties associated with therapeutic misconception.
4 | PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing discussion, and the fact that PFSs are likely to be unfa-
miliar to many potential participants, have some practical implications
for the gaining of consent. A specific requirement is to ensure, as far
as possible, that participants understand not only that PFSs have goals
related to research rather than clinical care, but also that these
research goals are only indirectly related to improving clinical practice.
Equally, irrespective of their appreciation of the scientific—rather than
clinical—orientation of the study, an attempt should be made to pro-
vide participants with an appropriately calibrated understanding of
the nature and magnitude of any benefit or harm that they might incur
through participation. With specific respect to pilot studies, their
resemblance to a conventional trial—and any explanation given of the
idea of therapeutic indifference that underlies equipoise—should not
lead participants to think that the aim of these studies is knowledge
that can be applied directly to clinical care and to base their consent
on this assumption. Similarly, with non-randomized feasibility studies,
it needs to be highlighted to participants that the design and purpose
of such studies allows for little in the way of direct clinically relevant
insights for either themselves or other patients.
For both pilot and feasibility studies, the fact that a subsequent
main trial may not take place needs particular emphasis.2 It may also
be important for participants to realize that, in some instances, con-
senting to take part in a pilot or feasibility will preclude them from
participating in a subsequent main trial for which they might other-
wise be eligible if, for clinical or methodological reasons, this later trial
requires ‘first-time’ participants—the foreclosure of this future oppor-
tunity would likely be material to their present decision. Equally,
patients should be clear as to the alternatives to participating in a PFS,
in terms of treatment they would thereby receive, in the same way as
in a main trial. This explanation requires their understanding of the
extent to which clinical benefit could be expected from participating
in the study—which, as we have seen, might be overestimated.
These are, however, challenging tasks, given trial participants'
generally poor comprehension of the benefits and harms outlined in
the consent process44 and the empirical difficulties of securing under-
standing and recall.16,42,45,46 This suggests that important aspects of
PFSs that may not readily be grasped by potential participants should
be actively explored with them, rather than simply being stated in
consent documentation.47 Asking participants to state their own
understanding or expectations of the study at the outset may help.48
In this way, the potential misperceptions discussed earlier may be
uncovered and clarified.
Such discussion should, however, be handled carefully. Based on
an ethnographic study of the consent process, Instone et al49 suggest
that terms such as ‘treatment trial’—used by investigators to partici-
pants and to one another—may reinforce the therapeutic
misconception among all parties, and in particular the misperception
that PFSs are concerned with testing clinical effectiveness. In an ear-
lier study, Bamberg et al50 argue that in the process of recruiting
patients to clinical research, investigators may speak in two different
‘voices’ at the same time—that of health care and that of research—
such that the participants ‘may misconceive the treatment of illness
and the research project as being the same thing’.50,p. 177 Investiga-
tors should therefore be mindful of the complex linguistic phenomena
underlying what potential participants say and what they interpret
from what they hear. These complexities may revolve around a prob-
lem of multiple speakers (participants may receive, from different indi-
viduals, conflicting messages around issues such as probability and
therapeutic benefit), a problem of semantic ambiguity (what partici-
pants and investigators understand by what they say or hear may dif-
fer, such that they may be asking or answering different questions), or
around a problem of pragmatics (the illocutionary purposes that
underlie communication, such that what a participant is trying to
achieve by a statement is a separate issue from its ostensible
meaning).51
It follows that helping participants towards an appreciation of
what a pilot or feasibility study involves, and which aspects are impor-
tant for a decision to either give or refuse consent, does not rest sim-
ply on providing fuller or more detailed information. This has the
danger of becoming a ‘deficit’ approach that locates the problems of
misperception solely within the participant. As Mathews et al52 indi-
cate, ‘there are two individuals, perspectives, and understandings in
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each interaction, rather than one individual (the patient) with imper-
fect understanding’.
5 | ISSUES RELATING TO ETHICAL
APPROVAL
Given the differences in purpose between main RCTs and PFSs,
research ethics committees should ensure that their expectations, and
what they require of investigators, are differentiated accordingly. First,
the committee should ensure that participant information sheets for
PFSs are clear that the study objectives are those of feasibility rather
than of treatment evaluation, and do not foster or reinforce the misper-
ceptions outlined above. Second, and relatedly, information sheets
should indicate clearly what type of clinical or broader scientific benefit
the study intends to provide. Third, committees should consider any
provision made for sharing of research results with participants, and for
communicating such plans to participants in the consent process. This
may involve either the aggregate findings of a study, or individual-level
results to particular participants. Notions of respect for persons and
beneficence suggest that this is a prima facie ethical obligation (with
some caveats in respect of individual-level results).53-55 If so, it should
be no less an expectation in PFSs than in main trials. On this basis, the
committee should be satisfied that participants in a PFS will be told
(or at least given the option to be told) of any subsequent decision
made on progression to a main trial, as their initial decision to partici-
pate may have been premised on assisting this outcome.
Fourth, a broader consideration is that, as the results of a PFS may
have relevance beyond the specific trial that the investigators propose
subsequently to conduct, the committee may expect to see clear plans
for dissemination of the results of the study. Finally, given that the ben-
efit derived from PFSs is defined in terms of a subsequent main trial,
the committee should be satisfied not only that the criteria on which
progression to the main trial would occur are appropriate, but also that
the main trial is scientifically robust on its own terms. These are, at least
partly, independent considerations, given that not all aspects of the via-
bility of a main trial can necessarily be addressed within a PFS. It follows
that the committee should receive sufficient information on both the
PFS and the subsequent study that is intended.
6 | CONCLUSION
If consent ‘has moral power whenever the consent is voluntary,
informed and decisionally competent’,56,p. 92 adequate disclosure by
the investigator and adequate comprehension by the participant are
crucial.16 However, differences in the aims of PFSs from those of main
trials, and the fact that these aims may be poorly understood by
potential participants, create specific challenges. In particular, misper-
ceptions such as therapeutic misconception and therapeutic mis-
estimation require some degree of re-interpretation. A careful
approach to the consent process, and specific attention to both the
manifest and the latent meaning of what is communicated in both
directions, may help to mitigate the challenges that are posed and give
participants' consent an appropriate moral weight in legitimizing the
investigator's actions.
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